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Competition Act, 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998)

Notices

Guidelines for the Determination of Administrative Penalties for Prohibited Practices

5. Methodology for the calculation of penalties

Step 1: Determination of Affected Turnover

 

5.3 The affected turnover is the firm's turnover derived from the sales of products and services that can be said to have been affected by the contravention.5

 

5.4 The Commission, as a general approach, will have regard to the firm's affected turnover during the base year.

 

5.5 The Commission will have regard to the firm's audited financial statements. Where audited financial statements are not available, the Commission may consider any other reliable records reflecting the firm's affected turnover or estimate the affected turnover based on available information.

 

5.6 Where the contravention took place within the auspices of an association of firms and the association is responsible for aiding, organising and/or executing the contravention, the association will be liable for payment of the administrative penalty, separately from the members of the association. The affected turnover that will generally be considered shall be based on the total revenue / members' contributions to fees, of the association.

 

5.7 In circumstances where the affected turnover of a firm is zero for a particular market (for example, in the case of market allocation agreements precluding entry into certain product or geographical areas), the Commission may consider the firm's annual turnover in the market that was protected as a result of the conduct, that is the market that was allocated to the firm as a result of the conduct.

 

5.8 In cases where there is a once-off bid-rigging contravention:
5.8.1 For the firm that is awarded the tender, and that was party to the collusive agreement, the Commission will consider the affected turnover to be the greater of (1) the value of the bid submitted by the successful bidder or (2) the value of the contract concluded or to be concluded pursuant to the tender process or (3) the amount ultimately paid to the successful bidder pursuant to the tender;
5.8.2 For the firm that was not awarded the tender, but was party to a collusive agreement in respect of the tender in question and submitted or agreed to submit purportedly competitive bids, or where it agrees to not submit a bid, or to submit a bid at a particular level to ensure that the tender is won by another firm, the Commission will consider the affected turnover to be the greater of (1) the value of the bid submitted by the unsuccessful firm in question (2) the value of the contract concluded or to be concluded pursuant to the tender process or (3) the amount ultimately paid to the successful bidder pursuant to the tender.

 

 

5 See paragraph 134 of the Competition Tribunal decision in Competition Commission v. Aveng Africa Limited t/a Steeledale, Reinforcing Mesh Solutions (Pty) Ltd, Vulcania Reinforcing (Pty) Ltd & BRC Mesh Reinforcing (Pty) Ltd Case No.: 84/CR/Dec09

See paragraph 45 of the Competition Tribunal decision in Competition Commission v. DPI Plastics (Pty) Ltd, Petzetakis Africa (Pty), Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd, Swan Plastics (Pty) Ltd, Amitech South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Flo-Tek Pipes & Irrigation (Pty) Ltd, MacNeil Agencies (Pty) Ltd, Andrag (Pty) Ltd, Gazelle Plastics (Pty) Ltd & Gazelle Engineering (Pty) Ltd Case No.: 15/CR/Feb09

 

 


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